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By providing favorable tax treatment to pensions, as compared 
with other assets, Canadian and U.S. tax policies encourage firms to 
offer pension plans. Such tax policy is common among countries in 
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. All 
countries with well-developed pension systems grant tax preferences to 
saving through pensions (Turner and Watanabe 1995).
The tax treatment of pensions results from compromises legislators 
make between competing political goals. Those goals include interper 
sonal equity in tax deductions and deferrals, as well as minimization of 
revenue loss from foregone taxes. While the broad goals of govern 
ments concerning pension tax policy are similar across developed 
countries, major differences occur within this framework.
In this regard, Canada and the United States are particularly inter 
esting to compare. The two countries are similar enough to make com 
parisons of differences useful: both have social security systems with 
moderate benefit levels that leave room for a private pension system to 
develop and both have voluntary private pension systems.
The level of family income in Canada and the United States is 
roughly equivalent. While average family income is slightly higher (by 
2.2 percent) in the United States, median family income is slightly 
lower (by 4.4 percent), reflecting the greater income inequality in the 
United States (Wolfson and Murphy 1994).'
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The elderly in the United States, however, have considerably 
higher income than their counterparts in Canada—19 percent higher 
for couples aged 65 to 74. The mix of income among the elderly also 
differs. Social security benefits are higher in Canada—6 percent 
higher for couples aged 65 to 74, accounting for 40 percent of the 
income of that group—in comparison with 31 percent for U.S. couples 
of that age. Income from private sources (earnings from working, pen 
sions, and savings) is higher in the United States (Wolfson and Murphy 
1994). 2
In both countries, workers in unions, manufacturing, large firms, 
and the public sector are more likely to be covered by a pension plan 
than are other workers. In the United States, the percentage of the pri 
vate sector workforce that is unionized has declined considerably, to 
about 11 percent in the late 1990s. In Canada, the percentage is 
roughly the same or perhaps slightly higher. 3 Public sector employ 
ment is more important in Canada than in the United States.
Because of their proximity and similar income and culture, one 
might think that the two neighbors would have similar tax policy 
toward pensions. In fact, important differences exist that may have 
caused differences in their private pension systems. Insights can be 
gained into the tax treatment of pensions in both countries by examin 
ing the differences.
The tax codes in both Canada and the United States place require 
ments on pension plans to qualify for favorable tax treatment. These 
include the requirement that the pension benefits of plan members 
must vest within a minimum number of years. These requirements 
have a strictly regulatory function, rather than being a revenue-raising 
aspect of tax policy. While regulations influence or determine some 
features of pension plans, we choose to ignore regulatory aspects of the 
tax code. We analyze instead how marginal tax rates affect pensions as 
a form of employee compensation.
OVERVIEW
Employer contributions to pension plans in Canada and the United 
States are treated similarly to wages—both are tax deductible under the
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corporate income tax. Book reserve financing, where an employer 
could receive a tax deduction without having made a contribution, is 
not allowed. 4 Investment earnings in pension funds accumulate tax 
free, and pension assets and liabilities are not taxed. 5
Workers are not taxed at the time their employer contributes to a 
pension fund; however, all distributions from pension funds to workers 
are taxable under the personal income tax. In Canada, retirees receive 
a tax credit for the first Can$ 1,000 of pension income. Pension distri 
butions in both countries are not subject to the social security payroll 
tax. Worker contributions are treated differently in the two countries 
and are discussed later. Both countries also offer workers individual 
plans not tied to a particular employer: Registered Retirement Savings 
Plans (RRSPs) in Canada and Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) 
in the United States.6
The tax system affects the role of pensions in the compensation of 
workers. 8 We examine how the tax treatment of pensions affects four 
pension policy issues: 1) pension coverage rates, 2) the generosity of 
pension benefits, 3) employer versus employee contributions, and 4) 
defined-benefit versus defined-contribution plans. 9
PENSION COVERAGE
The pension coverage rate is the percentage of the workforce cov 
ered by a pension. Although the concept is simple, the coverage rate is 
measured in considerably different ways, producing a range of statis 
tics.
Empirical comparisons of private sector workers in Canada and the 
United States, such as the earlier comparison of the percentage of 
unionized workers, are difficult because the distinction between the 
private and public sector is less clear in Canada than it is in the United 
States. It appears that some public sector Canadian workers who work 
for institutions such as universities, hospitals, and public corporations 
(such as Air Canada), rather than traditional government bureaucracies, 
respond in household surveys that they are private sector workers. 
Because of this, Canadian data for the entire workforce are much more 
reliable than are data that attempt to distinguish between the public and
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private sectors. Because the public sector is relatively larger in Can 
ada, however, and because pension coverage rates are considerably 
higher in the public than the private sector, empirical comparisons 
across the two countries are difficult. The coverage rate for the entire 
workforce has the advantage that it indicates the percentage of the 
workforce in the two countries that has an employer-provided pension 
that supplements social security. It has the disadvantage that the rate is 
influenced by government policy concerning the relative size of the 
public sector.
Dailey and Turner (1992) attempted to comparably measure pri 
vate pension coverage for Canada and the United States. They found 
that, for many years, the private pension coverage rate was about 50 
percent higher in the United States than in Canada. Since 1975, the 
pension coverage rate for full-time private sector workers has varied 
between 28 and 30 percent in Canada and between 44 and 46 percent 
in the United States.
Several problems caused those figures to overstate the difference in 
private sector coverage rates between Canada and the United States. In 
1990, Statistics Canada determined it was impossible to accurately 
determine private sector pension coverage rates because of difficulties 
in determining who was in the private sector, and that previous figures 
underestimated pension coverage. The U.S. figures are overstated rela 
tive to those of Canada because the Canadian figures include the unem 
ployed as part of the labor force, while the U.S. figures include only 
wage and salary workers, not the unemployed. After adjusting for 
these factors based on a somewhat subjective assessment of the magni 
tude of their effects, it still appears that the private sector pension cov 
erage rate was at least 5 percentage points higher in the United States 
than it was in Canada.
By contrast, when examining pension coverage provided by both 
private and public sector employers, the coverage rates by income for 
all workers are higher in Canada for all income levels except the low 
est, where the rate is slightly lower (Table 1). The coverage rates are 
10 to 20 percentage points higher in the middle income categories; in 
the highest income category, the difference is only 4 percentage points.
Because one goal of pension tax policy is to encourage pension 
coverage, an important pension policy issue is the extent to which dif 
ferences in pension coverage in Canada and the United States arise
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SOURCE: Canada—Franken and Maser (1992, p. 29); United States—unpublished 
tabulations from the 1993 Current Population Survey Special Pension Supplement.
because of differences in the tax treatment of pensions. In both Canada 
and the United States, the tax system encourages employers to offer 
pensions. Workers reduce their total lifetime taxes when they receive 
some compensation as a pension rather than taking all compensation as 
wages. In both countries, pension coverage rates increase with 
income, presumably at least partially because tax rates increase with 
income.
Marginal Income Tax Rates
If an individual's marginal income tax rate is the same in the prere 
tirement and postretirement periods, the individual earns the pretax 
rate of return on pension saving in both Canada and the United States. 
This occurs because the investment earnings on pension funds are 
untaxed. The incentive that the tax system provides for participating in 
a pension is thus higher with higher marginal income tax rates. The 
"wedge" between the pretax and the after-tax rate of return is higher in 
Canada for most workers because income tax rates are higher in Can 
ada and the top rates are reached at much lower levels of income.
Provincial tax rates differ in Canada but to a lesser extent than do 
state income tax rates (Alpert, Shoven, and Whalley 1992). About 40 
percent of Canadian employees work in the province of Ontario, and 
thus Ontario is a major component of the Canadian experience. In 
1996, the maximum tax rate—federal plus provincial—was 53 percent 
in Ontario (Table 2). This maximum rate was reached at a taxable
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Table 2 Marginal Federal Plus Provincial or State Income Tax Rates in 
Canada and the United States


















NOTE: Data for Canada are from the Province of Ontano; data for the United States 
represents a national average. Provincial income tax rates are much higher in Canada 
than are state income tax rates in the United States. The average state income tax 
rates are calculated from the Current Population Survey Special Pension Supplement, 
April 1993 for the tax year 1992. For the income brackets in the table, they are, 
respectively, 3.8%, 4.6%, 5.1%, 5.9% and 5.9%. Because of top coding of income in 
the data, there is no income reported greater than $250,000. The average state income 
tax rate for the preceding category is used for the top income category in this table.
income of $49,990. (Unless indicated otherwise, all amounts are 
expressed in U.S. dollars, at the exchange rate of U.S.$0.75 for each 
Canadian dollar.)
In both Canada and the United States, marginal federal income tax 
rates were reduced during the 1980s. In Canada, they were reduced 
from 65 percent in 1980 to 29 percent in 1987. It should be noted, 
however, that provincial income tax rates are much higher than state 
income tax rates. For this reason, comparing only marginal federal tax 
rates is misleading because the federal/provincial split of income tax is 
far different than the federal/state split in the United States.
In the United States, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 reduced the top 
federal rate on the highest-income households to 28 percent. The high 
est rate was 33 percent, which applied for some middle income taxpay 
ers. The top rate in 1980 had been 70 percent. Marginal tax rates have 
since risen. The highest marginal federal income tax rate in 1994, 
applied to families with income above $250,000, was 39.6 percent 
(Table 2). In addition, taxpayers are liable for state income tax, which 
in some states reaches as high as 11 percent. Thus, the highest mar-
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ginal income tax rate in the United States (state plus federal rates) is 
currently 51 percent, but only the top few percent of families pay that 
rate. Workers with family income of $50,000 would pay, on average, a 
marginal tax rate (federal plus state) of about 33 percent and thus have 
marginal tax rates about 20 percentage points lower than in Canada. 9
These comparisons do not include social security taxes. Social 
security is largely funded through general revenues in Canada, while it 
is funded by a payroll tax in the United States. When social security 
taxes are included, the share of social security and personal income 
taxes in GNP in 1987 was 18.0 percent in Canada and 19.5 percent in 
the United States (Wilson 1992). The social security payroll tax rate in 
Canada in 1993 was 5 percent, shared equally by employers and 
employees. This compares to 12.4 percent shared equally by employ 
ers and employees in the United States (U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services, Social Security Administration 1994). In both cases, 
it is presumed that employees bear the incidence of the payroll tax. 
However, to the extent social security benefits are related to earnings, 
some workers may view the true social security tax rate as being lower 
than the statutory rate (Burkhauser and Turner 1985).
Empirical studies in the United States have shown that higher mar 
ginal income tax rates encourage the provision of pensions. In their 
study of pension coverage in 1979,1988, and 1993, Reagan and Turner 
(2000) found that, on average, a 1 percentage point increase in mar 
ginal income tax rates increases pension coverage rates by 0.4 percent 
age points. 10 This finding suggests that, based solely on marginal 
income tax rates, pension coverage would be roughly 5 to 7 percentage 
points higher in Canada than in the United States.
Income Tax Progressivity
As well as being affected by the level of marginal income tax rates, 
the tax incentive for pensions is greater with a greater progressivity of 
the tax system. Workers generally have lower income in retirement 
than while working. The more progressive the tax system, the more 
their reduced income during retirement will lower the marginal tax rate 
they pay on their pension benefits.
Because the highest marginal rate starts at a much lower income in 
Canada, marginal rates are more "compressed," so that it might appear
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that higher income Canadians are less likely than Americans to face 
lower marginal rates in their retirement years than while working.
In the United States, however, the tax system is also not very pro 
gressive but for a different reason. The top marginal bracket begins at 
a high income level, and a single marginal rate covers a wide range of 
the distribution of income. Reagan and Turner (2000) found that, in 
their regression sample of males aged 21 to 55, the marginal tax rate 
(federal plus state) in 1979 was 32 percent, with a standard deviation of 
13 percentage points. These figures had declined in 1993 to a marginal 
rate of 25 percent with a standard deviation of 9 percentage points. 
Thus, it appears that neither the Canadian nor the U.S. tax system is 
very progressive, and differences in the progressivity of the income tax 
systems cannot explain the lower pension coverage rates for private 
sector workers in Canada.
Tax Subsidies for High-Income Workers
To further examine coverage rate differences between the two 
countries, we focus separately on the tax treatment of high- and low- 
income workers. The centerpiece of tax reform in Canada in the early 
1990s was the establishment of a comprehensive limit to tax-assisted 
pension saving. All workers are permitted to contribute the lesser of 
18 percent of their earned income (in the previous calendar year) or a 
maximum dollar amount (if lower) to an RRSP. In 1995, this dollar 
amount equalled $11,625, or 18 percent of $64,550. The latter is the 
level of earned income above which there is no tax-assisted pension 
saving for members of defined-benefit pension plans.
For individuals with relatively high incomes, the tax assistance 
provided to pension savings is considerably higher in the United 
States. In the United States, from 1993 to 1996, the maximum com 
pensation that could be used for calculating pension benefits that 
receive preferential tax treatment was $150,000, with this figure being 
raised to $160,000 in 1997."
Some benefits consultants have argued that a low ceiling on com 
pensation used for calculating pension benefits reduces the incentive 
for employers to provide pensions because the personal benefit to high- 
income employers is reduced. This argument is most likely to be valid 
for the owners of successful small firms, where the owner may weigh
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the amount that he or she can accumulate in a pension versus the cost 
of providing pensions to his or her employees. If this argument is 
valid, it may partly explain why pension coverage appears to be lower 
in the private sector in Canada.
In the United States since 1984, some higher income taxpayers 
have faced an implicit tax on their pension benefits in addition to the 
personal income tax. Up to 50 percent of social security benefits could 
be included in taxable income for persons with adjusted gross income 
plus certain nontaxable income above $25,000 for individuals and 
$32,000 for married couples. Under the 1993 Omnibus Budget Recon 
ciliation Act, a two-tier tax liability was established, so that the taxable 
proportion of social security benefits for retirees with income in the 
second-tier range was increased to 85 percent. Thus, for some workers 
at the margin, increases in pension benefits are taxed at the worker's 
marginal tax rate and cause the worker's social security benefits to 
become taxable. Eighteen percent of families with social security ben 
efits pay taxes on those benefits, but more than half of families in the 
eighth, ninth, and tenth deciles are taxed (Pattison 1994). The net 
result is that many higher income workers pay an implicit tax on pen 
sion benefits of 20 to 40 percent due to the taxation of their social secu 
rity benefits.
Housing as an Alternative Investment for High-Income Workers
Housing ownership is taxed differently in the two countries (Pot- 
erba 1992). In Canada, mortgage interest is not tax deductible, but 
capital gains are not taxed. In the United States, mortgage interest is 
tax deductible, but capital gains are taxed when a person sells their res 
idence and does not purchase a residence of equal or greater value. 
The tax liability is subject to a lifetime exclusion of $150,000. Since 
Canadians must pay the before-tax rate of interest on their mortgages, 
they can in effect receive the before-tax rate of return by paying down 
their mortgage. Thus, housing provides an alternative vehicle for 
investing at the before-tax rate of return. In the United States, home- 
owners in effect pay the after-tax rate of return on their mortgages 
because they can deduct their mortgage interest payments. Thus, it is 
relatively more favorable to finance housing with debt than equity in 
the United States, making pension investments relatively more favor-
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able in the United States. This is especially true for high-income work 
ers with high tax rates.
Two-thirds of Canadian elderly own their own homes and 86 per 
cent of those have homes that are mortgage free (Chappell 1990). The 
comparable figure for the United States is 70 percent home ownership, 
57 percent of which are mortgage free (Struyk, Turner, and Ueno 
1988). Thus, it appears that the different tax treatment of mortgages 
causes elderly Americans to be much more likely to have one.
In sum, high-income workers in Canada face a greater tax incen 
tive to invest in tax-sheltered assets than they do in the United States. 
However, the amount they can shelter through pensions is lower, and 
housing is relatively more favorable an equity investment in Canada.
Implicit Taxes on Low-Income Workers
In addition to explicit taxes, implicit taxes may also reduce the net 
receipt of pension benefits. For Canadians with low lifetime earnings, 
the income-tested component of the social security system discourages 
participation in an employer-sponsored pension plan. All Canadians 
aged 65 and over, independent of their work history, receive a flat-rate 
Old Age Security (OAS) benefit. As of January 1, 1994, these benefits 
were worth $3,472 per year. Canadians with no other source of income 
also receive income-tested benefits from the Guaranteed Income Sup 
plement (GIS), worth a maximum of $4,127 per year. For each dollar 
of retirement income in excess of the flat rate OAS benefits, GIS bene 
fits are reduced by 50 cents.
The maximum pension payable from the earnings-related compo 
nent of Canada's public retirement system, the Canada Pension Plan 
(CPP) was $6,250 as of January 1, 1994. The maximum Canada Pen 
sion Plan benefit would be received by individuals whose lifetime 
earnings (in 1994 dollars) average $25,800 per year. Thus, an individ 
ual who receives the maximum CPP benefit would still qualify for par 
tial GIS benefits if the individual had no other retirement income than 
the flat-rate OAS benefits. So, too, would individuals not entitled to 
the maximum CPP benefit.
The net result is that Canadians with low lifetime earnings face a 
50 percent tax rate on private pension income during retirement, this 
rate being in addition to federal and provincial income taxes. These
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public pension provisions, in effect since 1966, thus discourage low- 
income workers from participating in an employer-sponsored pension 
plan. 12 A similar disincentive exists in the United States because of the 
income testing for eligibility for Supplemental Security Income, but 
that program only affects very low income workers.
Individual Pension Plans
The Canadian government has set contribution limits for defined- 
contribution plans—money-purchase plans and RRSPs—equivalent to 
the limits for defined-benefit plans. Also, the federal tax rules treat 
employer and employee contributions the same, regardless of the type 
of pension plan.
A primary objective of the Canadian tax treatment of pensions is to 
provide equitable tax assistance for retirement, regardless of whether a 
worker participates in a company-sponsored pension plan or in an indi 
vidual account pension plan. In Canada, workers who set up a RRSP 
can access the same amount of tax assistance as do workers who par 
ticipate in an employer-provided plan.
Registered Retirement Savings Plans also enjoy other advantages 
over IRAs. Since Canadian tax reform in 1990, failure to contribute to 
a RRSP by the deadline does not cause the deduction to be lost. 
Unused contribution amounts, subject to a seven-year limit, may be 
carried forward and deducted later when made. No such carry-forward 
provision exists for IRAs in the United States.
Participation in RRSPs has increased greatly in Canada. In 1970, 2 
percent of the total population aged 18 to 70 contributed to a RRSP. 
By 1988, 25 percent of all tax filers contributed to a RRSP, with an 
average contribution of Can$3,545 (Venti and Wise 1995).
Since 1990, the tax treatment of RRSPs has meant there is no tax 
advantage to participating in an employer-provided plan since an equal 
amount could be contributed to either type of plan. This change should 
cause a reduction in pension coverage rates in Canada. However, a 
study of data prior to the change found no negative relationship 
between the amount of employer-provided pension assets held by an 
individual and their RRSP assets (Venti and Wise 1994). In 1987, for 
example, 37 percent of tax filers who contributed to a pension plan also
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contributed to a RRSP, versus only 16 percent of tax filers who did not 
contribute to a pension plan (Franken 1990).
In the United States, no attempt has been made to equalize the 
treatment between employer-sponsored plans and individual plans. 
Employers in the United States have a near monopoly in the provision 
of tax-favored pension benefits. Since 1981, the maximum an individ 
ual can deduct for contributions to an IRA has been frozen at $2,000. 13 
Inflation has reduced the real value of the tax deduction for IRAs by 
more than half since 1981.
Summary and Other Explanations
The higher marginal income tax rates in Canada would—other 
things equal—cause pension coverage rates to be roughly 5 to 7 per 
centage points higher in Canada than in the United States. This effect 
may be offset somewhat by higher social security tax rates in the 
United States. An explanation for relatively lower pension coverage 
rates at lower income levels in Canada is that the income-tested provi 
sions of the Canadian social security system place an implicit tax of 50 
percent on the pension benefits of workers with low lifetime earnings.
Other factors besides taxes affect pension coverage. While it is 
beyond the scope of this chapter to fully investigate other possible fac 
tors, several are mentioned that would cause pension coverage rates to 
be lower in Canada than in the United States. Social security is moder 
ately more generous in Canada than it is in the United States, which 
would lower pension benefit levels and probably also pension coverage 
rates in Canada. The United States, through nondiscrimination rules, 
requires employers that offer pensions to offer them to most of their 
employees. This regulation is one way that public policy attempts to 
expand coverage. Canada has no such regulation.
In Canada, pension benefits are locked in after vesting, and work 
ers cannot access them until retirement. In the United States, workers 
can often take a lump-sum distribution from their pension plan when 
they change jobs. Some U.S. policy analysts have argued that prohibit 
ing preretirement lump-sum distributions would reduce pension cover 
age because it would reduce the flexibility that workers have to use 
those funds for various purposes. These locking-in provisions, which
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are contained in provincial legislation, have been in effect in most 
provinces since only 1987.
THE GENEROSITY OF PENSION PLANS
While pension coverage measures one dimension of the extent to 
which pension plans are provided, the generosity of pension plans 
measures another. One measure of pension plan generosity is the level 
of pension benefits being paid to current retirees. The level of pension 
benefits, however, does not directly measure the generosity of pension 
benefit formulas because other factors also affect benefit levels. For 
example, if a pension system is immature, workers having participated 
in it for less than their full career, it will pay lower retirement benefits 
than an equally generous system that is fully mature. While it is not 
evident that the Canadian and U.S. pension systems differ in their 
maturity, such a difference could cause average benefits to differ.
Canadian private pension plans are slightly less generous than U.S 
private plans in the level of benefits they provide. Canadian pensions 
in the late 1980s provided slightly less and U.S. pensions provided 
slightly more than $6,000 in annual benefits (Dailey and Turner 1992).
Canada and the United States differ considerably in the maximum 
amount that a worker can save through the pension system. In Canada, 
the maximum percentage of earnings that a worker can save is lower 
and, as indicated earlier, the maximum earnings that can be used in 
determining pension benefits is much lower.
The maximum limit in Canada for contributions to a defined con 
tribution plan is 18 percent of worker earnings, based on the previous 
year's earnings. In Canada, the maximum benefit for a defined-benefit 
plan is the lesser of $45,185 per year or 70 percent of the participant's 
earnings in the three highest years.
Both the defined-contribution and defined-benefit limits are higher 
in the United States. The maximum contributions to a defined-contri 
bution plan in 1997 are the lesser of 25 percent of earnings or $30,000 
a year. For a defined-benefit plan, the maximum benefit is the lesser of 
$125,000 a year or 100 percent of the participant's average compensa 
tion for his or her three highest earnings years. For high-income work-
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ers, the maximum pension benefit in Canada is about half of that in the 
United States.
The lower maximum contributions and benefits, however, may be 
of little economic significance if few workers are constrained by the 
limits. The difference is most likely to be constraining for older work 
ers and higher income workers who, because of the ceiling on social 
security benefits, are more likely to wish to save a relatively large frac 
tion of their income for retirement.
If the 18 percent maximum is not a binding constraint, the higher 
marginal income tax rates in Canada would encourage middle income 
workers to save more in pensions than they do in the United States.
EMPLOYER VERSUS EMPLOYEE CONTRIBUTIONS
In Canada, a major tenet of pension policy is equal treatment of 
different options. This consideration has been considerably less 
important in the United States. One aspect of the policy of equal treat 
ment is that employees in Canada can make tax-deductible contribu 
tions to both defined-benefit and defined-contribution plans. In the 
United States, employee contributions to defined-benefit plans and to 
most types of defined-contribution plans are not tax deductible.
In the United States, employee contributions are only tax deduct 
ible if made to a type of defined-contribution plan called a salary 
reduction plan. The most common type of salary reduction plan is the 
401(k) plan. 14 As a result of the tax rules, few employees contribute to 
pension plans other than 401(k) plans.
Even for 401(k) plans, however, employee contributions are taxed 
more heavily than employer contributions. Employee contributions are 
subject to the social security payroll tax, while employer contributions 
are not. 15 Employee contributions are subject to the payroll tax on the 
grounds that to do otherwise would erode the payroll tax base, causing 
an increasingly small percentage of compensation to be subject to the 
payroll tax.
The feature permitting deductible employee contributions to 
401(k) plans favors those plans relative to other types of plans, and 
they have grown considerably. Between 1984 and 1993, 401(k) plans
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gained 15.6 million participants, while defined-benefit plans and all 
other types of defined-contribution plans lost participants (U.S. 
Department of Labor 1997).
Economic theory suggests that, due to compensating differentials, 
workers pay for employer contributions through reductions in wages 
and other compensation. While this theory has proven difficult to test 
empirically, some studies have found evidence supporting it (Mont 
gomery, Shaw, and Bennedict 1992). If workers do pay for employer 
pension contributions through reduced wages, the distinction between 
employer and employee contributions is unimportant. Assuming labor 
markets adjust imperfectly, however, or workers have imperfect knowl 
edge, there may be some effects. Benefits consultants frequently argue 
that workers undervalue employer pension contributions relative to 
their own contributions because they are less aware of, and thus tend to 
understate, the amount of employer contributions necessary to provide 
the benefits they will receive.
In spite of the argument that the distinction between employer 
and employee contributions is economically unimportant, provincial 
pension legislation throughout Canada, as well as pension legislation 
in the United States, treats employee contributions differently from 
employer contributions. In Canada, a universal provision in provincial 
pension regulation is that employer contributions must pay for at least 
50 percent of the accrued value of defined-benefit pensions at the date 
of the employee's termination, retirement, or death. Employee 
"excess" contributions may (depending upon the jurisdiction) be reim 
bursed, transferred, or used to increase benefits. To implement this 
provision, a minimum rate of interest is imputed to employee contribu 
tions, through regulation or statute.
Except for the flat benefit plans that predominate among unionized 
workers in the private sector, employees as well as employers contrib 
ute to most pension plans in Canada. Virtually all public sector plans 
are contributory, while about one-half of plan members in the private 
sector are in contributory plans.
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DEFINED-BENEFIT VERSUS 
DEFINED-CONTRIBUTION PLANS
In the United States, there has been a major shift from defined-ben- 
efit plans towards defined-contribution plans. While the number of 
participants in defined-benefit plans was slightly lower in 1993 than in 
1984, the number of participants in defined-contribution plans grew by 
11 million over that period due to the growth of 401(k) plans (U.S. 
Department of Labor 1997). In Canada, there has also been a trend 
towards defined-contribution plans, but that trend has been much 
weaker. Between 1982 and 1995, for example, the percentage of pen 
sion participants who belonged to money-purchase plans rose from 5.3 
percent to 10.0 percent, while the percentage who belonged to defined- 
benefit plans declined from 93.7 to 88.6 percent. 16 This section exam 
ines the extent to which differences in tax policy can account for the 
much more pronounced trend towards defined-contribution plans in the 
United States.
Tax reform in Canada, implemented in 1990, seeks to "level the 
playing field" with regard to the tax assistance provided to pension sav 
ing in different types of plans. The maximum amount of tax assistance 
provided to members of employer-sponsored defined-benefit and 
defined-contribution plans, as well as to individual RRSPs, is intended 
to be equal. Further, through the introduction of new carry-forward 
provisions, individuals are provided with greater flexibility in the tim 
ing of RRSP contributions. These provisions were enacted because 
firms who sponsor defined-benefit plans can make retroactive enrich 
ments in their plans.
In Canada, the 18 percent maximum allowable contribution to a 
defined-contribution plan was chosen because it is roughly equivalent 
to the defined-benefit limit. The defined-benefit limit is 2 percent of 
final earnings per year of service, with a maximum of 70 percent of 
highest earnings (Wyatt Company 1990).
In the United States, the defined-benefit limit does not vary with 
years of service, as it does in Canada. The maximum benefit that can 
be received from a defined-contribution plan, in both Canada and the 
United States, necessarily increases with service because the maximum 
benefit is based on the accumulation of contributions and investment
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earnings over time. Because the U.S. limit does not vary with service, 
short-service workers in the United States can receive higher benefits 
through a defined-benefit plan than through a defined-contribution 
plan. For long-service workers, the situation is the reverse.
Within its lower contribution limits, Canada allows individuals 
greater flexibility in the timing of their contributions. In Canada, an 
individual's unused contribution allowance in each year is carried for 
ward indefinitely for use in subsequent years, subject to certain dollar 
limits. Similarly, contributions not deductible in the year in which they 
are paid may be deducted in subsequent years.
This flexibility for defined-contribution plans was introduced to 
bring them on equal footing with the flexibility that is available to 
employers for contributions to defined-benefit plans. This flexibility 
occurs, however, at the cost of increased complexity of administration 
of pension plans.
In the United States, contributions not deductible in the year paid 
are subject to a 10 percent excise tax. Before 1987, a credit carry-for 
ward was available when an employer's contributions to a profit-shar 
ing plan were less than the maximum allowed (McGill and Grubbs 
1989, p. 652). That carryforward is no longer available. Flexibility is 
provided, however, by the higher limit on contributions, so it is not 
clear which system effectively provides the greater flexibility.
As indicated earlier, in the United States, employee contributions 
are only tax deductible for defined-contribution plans and then only for 
contributions to 401 (k) plans. This feature of the tax code may favor 
defined-contribution plans. In Canada, employee contributions are tax 
deductible to defined-benefit plans.
The Tax Benefit of Overfunding Defined Benefit-Plans
In assessing the reasons why employers might prefer to sponsor 
defined-benefit plans rather than defined-contribution plans, financial 
economists (Tepper 1981) have drawn attention to the tax advantages 
to shareholders of overfunding such plans. In the United States, the 
Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1987 (OBRA) reduced the desirability 
of defined-benefit plans relative to defined-contribution plans by reduc 
ing the amount that could be contributed to overfunded defined-benefit 
plans (Ippolito 1990).
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Under the OBRA rules, employer contributions are not tax deduct 
ible if the plan is overfunded by 50 percent on a termination basis. 
This reduces the flexibility firms have in managing defined-benefit 
plans, and it reduces the amount that can be sheltered from tax. Termi 
nation liabilities are calculated as if the plan were to terminate immedi 
ately. For plans with a typical age structure of workers, these liabilities 
are considerably less than the liabilities calculated assuming that the 
plan will continue in existence. Those liabilities for ongoing plans rec 
ognize that currently accruing benefits are based on future wages, in 
final average pay plans. Under the OBRA rules, many defined-benefit 
plans cannot contribute sufficient amounts to a pension plan to cover 
the current accrual of liabilities. This creates a tax disadvantage for 
defined benefit plans because, by comparison, in defined contribution 
plans firms can contribute an amount equal to the full current accrual 
of liabilities.
In Canada, too, the tax authorities seek to limit the amount of over- 
funding in defined-benefit plans. However, the restrictions are less 
onerous than those now in effect in the United States. In Canada, 
employer contributions are tax deductible so long as the surplus in the 
plan is no more than 10 percent of actual plan liabilities or twice the 
annual value of current service contributions. However, the plan's lia 
bilities are not valued on a termination basis for the purpose of this cal 
culation. Indeed, if the plan has a history of cost-of-living or similar 
adjustments, these may be taken into account in determining the plan's 
liability if it is reasonable to assume that such adjustments will con 
tinue. These adjustments would include ad hoc increases for pension 
ers and increases in accrued benefits under career average earnings 
plans and flat benefit plans. In Canada, a potentially more important 
constraint on the extent of overfunding is the uncertainty that may exist 
as to the ownership of surplus assets.
Summary
In Canada, an effort has been made to equalize the treatment of 
defined-benefit and defined-contribution plans. As a result, employee 
contributions are tax deductible for both defined-benefit and defined- 
contribution plans, while they are only tax deductible to (one type of) 
defined-contribution plans in the United States. Defined-benefit plans
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also receive more favorable tax treatment in Canada than in the United 
States in terms of allowable maximum funding. Greater flexibility is 
allowed for contributions to defined-contribution plans in Canada than 
in the United States, in order to try to equalize the degree of flexibility 
that employers and employees have to contribute to both types of 
plans. On balance, tax policy in Canada is relatively more favorable to 
defined-benefit plans than it is in the United States.
CONCLUSIONS
Major differences in the tax treatment of pensions in the United 
States and Canada may help explain differences in the pension systems 
in the two countries. They may account for differences in pension cov 
erage and the prevalence of defined-benefit plans relative to defined- 
contribution plans.
In Canada, high marginal tax rates on income at upper income lev 
els suggest that pension coverage should be higher among upper 
income workers in Canada than it is in the United States. However, the 
maximum benefit that an upper income worker can receive in Canada 
is much less than in the United States.
The high effective tax rates on private pension incomes of low- 
income retirees due to the earnings-testing of retirement benefits in 
Canada suggest that coverage rates should be lower in Canada than 
they are in the United States for low-income individuals.
Tax reform in Canada in 1990 sought to "level the playing field" 
with regard to the tax assistance provided pension savings. In particu 
lar, and unlike the United States, the self-employed and those not cov 
ered by an employer-provided pension plan are—through the vehicle 
of the Registered Retirement Savings Plan—provided with more equal 
access to tax assistance.
Employee contributions to occupational pension plans in Canada 
are tax deductible, unlike the case for employee contributions to 
defined-benefit plans in the United States. In both countries, employee 
contributions are treated differently by pension law than are employer 
contributions. This fact, in turn, focuses attention on the issue of the 
ultimate incidence of employer contributions. Implicit in pension law
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in Canada appears to be the assumption that the ultimate incidence of 
employer contributions does not fall upon employees.
Defined-benefit plans receive more favorable tax treatment in Can 
ada than they do in the United States. In Canada, the tax treatment of 
defmed-benefit plans is also more favorable relative to the tax treat 
ment of defined-contribution plans. The move towards defmed-benefit 
plans has been much weaker in Canada.
While assessment of the magnitude of the effects of these differ 
ences in tax policy is difficult, in part because the tax treatment of pen 
sions differs in a number of ways, we believe that important insights 
concerning the possible range of the parameters of pension tax policy 
can be gained by comparing Canada and the United States.
Notes
The material in this chapter is the responsibility of the authors and does not represent 
the position of the institutions with which they are associated. Patricia Reagan has 
made valuable comments.
1. This study used the 1988 purchasing power parity of Can$l equals U.S.$0 80. 
We use the slightly lower value of U.S.$0.72 for making comparisons.
2. The lower average Social Security benefits in the United States may arise in part 
because more older Americans are working and not receiving Social Security ben 
efits.
3. It is difficult to determine a precise estimate of the private sector unionization rate 
in Canada because of difficulties in measuring the private sector workforce, a 
topic that is discussed later.
4. Such financing is allowed in Germany and Japan by simply recording the liability 
for the pension plan on the company's financial books.
5. In the United States, premium payments to the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corpo 
ration are based on the unfunded liabilities of pension plans. This is also true for 
the Guarantee Fund in Ontario. We are not considering these levies as taxes.
6. For a more complete discussion of taxation of pensions in Canada, see Jobm et al. 
(1991).
7. Generally, a tax policy affecting a workers' decisions distorts economic activity 
from what it would have been without taxes. However, in a system with multiple 
taxes, one aspect of taxation may correct distortions introduced by another aspect. 
The optimality of pension tax policy in terms of creating or correcting distortions 
is not discussed here (Ippolito 1990).
8. We thus do not discuss, for example, the effects of taxation of pensions on income 
distribution, government revenues, or the capital market.
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9. The higher marginal personal income taxes in Canada are reflected in personal 
income taxes being about 25 percent larger as a percentage of GNP in Canada 
than they are in the United States (Wilson 1992)
10. The marginal effect is probably lower at higher tax rates. See also Woodbury 
(1983), Woodbury and Bettinger (1991), and Woodbury and Huang (1991).
11. An explanation for the more favorable tax treatment for pensions of high-income 
workers in the United States may be that with its higher income inequality, there 
are relatively more high-income workers in the United States, and they therefore 
presumably have more political power.
12. This issue has important implications, as well, for public policy. In Canada, the 
fact that pension coverage is far from universal is often cited by critics as proof of 
the inadequacy of the private pensions system and the need, therefore, to expand 
the public pension system or to mandate private pension coverage (In 1990, 49.6 
percent of males and 33.1 percent of females who participated in the labor force 
belonged to an occupational pension plan. [Statistics Canada 1990, Text Table D, 
page 8].) However, the absence of universal coverage is perhaps best seen as a 
statement about workers' revealed preferences rather than as a "failure" of the pri 
vate pension system.
The introduction of a mandatory private pension plan, inclusive of part-time as 
well as full-time workers, is likely to reduce the lifetime resources available to 
those with low lifetime earnings. The incidence of employer contributions to a 
mandatory private pension plan (if it is not retroactive) is likely to fall ultimately 
on the employee. Workers, including those with low lifetime earnings, will be 
required to allocate a larger fraction of their lifetime earnings to provide for their 
retirement years On one hand, this will gradually reduce the likelihood of future 
claims on income-tested programs such as GIS. On the other hand, by forcing 
persons with low lifetime earnings to provide a larger share of their own retire 
ment incomes, this proposal may redistribute income away from those with low 
lifetime earnings.
In this context, two facts merit note. First, persons whose current earnings are 
low are less likely to be members of occupational pension plans To the extent 
that current earnings are positively correlated with lifetime earnings, this fact sug 
gests that those with low lifetime earnings are less likely to be -covered by an 
occupational pension plan. Second, Canadians with low current incomes gener 
ally choose not to contribute to RRSPs. Given the low value to them of the tax 
subsidy associated with RRSP contributions together with the likelihood that they 
would be substituting their own savings for retirement for benefits available from 
income-tested public programs, this decision is probably rational
13. The amount is $2,500 for a worker whose spouse does not also contribute to an 
IRA.
14. These plans are named after the enabling section of the Internal Revenue Code.
15. Because both tax payments and future benefits are increased by increases in earn 
ings, for some workers the payroll tax may not be a tax when viewed in a life- 
cycle setting (Burkhauser and Turner 1985).
16. These figures do not add to 100 percent due to the presence of "composite and 
other plans."
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